CTBTO Election Postponement Offers Chance to Reflect on Diversity and Inclusion
Over the past few months, COVID-19 has laid bare a series of racial and economic injustices. Seemingly primed to fix them, various leaders and international institutions such as the United Nations have promoted messages of social justice, diversity and inclusion as the international community strives to “Build Back Better”. It is therefore curious that injustices of exactly these kinds are playing a role in the leadership battle of a leading international organisation tasked with safeguarding global peace and security. Recent events have pointed to some wealthy, Western states unevenly upholding a “pay-to-play” system to determine who has a voice in selecting the future leader of this institution.
Ahead of the originally scheduled late-November election of the next Executive Secretary[1] of the Vienna-based Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), the last few months have seen intense debates over whether countries who have yet to meet their financial obligations should be allowed to vote. The Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat have worked tirelessly over the last 25 years to bring the international community on board to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) while simultaneously building the billion-dollar-plus global monitoring system used to detect potential nuclear tests. Such activity has relied on member state contributions that are calculated relatively based on the capacity of each state to contribute.
As of earlier this summer, 73 of 184 member states had their voting rights suspended on payment-related grounds, though this number has recently decreased to 60 (as of 15 November) after some offered up the necessary funds.[2] The fees of these remaining 60 countries amount to only 5.953% of the portion of the organisation’s total annual budget paid by member states. For many of them — especially those with developing economies — paying their balances is not an urgent priority or even administratively possible as they face concurrent challenges. Countries have cited various factors that are compounding the effects of the pandemic for why they would like to be able to vote without settling their ledgers just yet, including conflict, climate change-related disasters, the falling prices of natural resources, and more.
In turn, this leaves 124 countries that can enjoy their voting rights on the basis of being in adequate financial standing with the organisation, only around two-thirds. Given the exceptional circumstances of the current recession that has hit the Global South first and worst, one would think that member states in the Preparatory Commission would have continued its almost quarter-century rhythm of consensus-based decision-making and given leniency to those who need it so that more could have a say. Instead, the process became highly politicised, replicating historical power practices of economic disenfranchisement and culminating in a final vote on 19 October that only granted a handful of countries their voting rights back.
Surely an organisation that provides enormous scientific insight into the planet’s health and wellbeing through its worldwide monitoring system warrants as diverse a representation as possible while choosing its leadership. However, recent events have made it difficult to ignore how politics and money have undermined a fair process of restoring voting rights. In particular, the Russian Federation, which led an effort since June to give all original 73 countries a process to apply to have their voting rights restored, has said there was a lack of objectivity in the final selection of the countries which were granted their privileges back. In fact, the Russian position is that Western countries ignored the established criteria that were agreed to in June and put into the related guidelines. These criteria noted that consideration would be given to applications of those countries whose current amount of arrears is less than the amount of contributions due from the preceding two full years or to those who have begun to negotiate a payment plan.
32 countries had applied by the deadline of 21 August, but only 25 were considered in the end because Colombia and Guatemala applied on the basis that they have constitutional or legal restrictions from paying until the Treaty enters into force, which was not part of the established criteria, and Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone ended up paying enough before the vote on the restoration of rights. The 19 October vote gave Afghanistan, Comoros, Ecuador, Libya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, and Yemen their voting rights back. The primary issue is the lack of clarity on what criteria were used to come up with the list of eight countries in the proposal advanced by Canada, as the Russians contend that their wider proposed list included all who met the previously decided criteria.
Diplomats in Vienna have made clear that there is an overwhelming belief that the inclusion of Iran on the Russian list was a primary reason why the US and some other Western powers did not support it. But why was Iran, which had negotiated a payment plan far before COVID-19 and already begun paying arrears, not seen as meeting the criteria? Many hoped that restoring Iran’s voting rights would help to maintain an open dialogue with Iran and its indispensable involvement in the CTBTO’s affairs. In fact, Iran has been one of the most active participants in all CTBT-related discussions and has provided important contributions in terms of policy ideas. For this reason, some Western countries such as France and Germany voted for the Russian proposal and, when it failed, the Canadian one. The only explanation given by those who opposed Iran’s inclusion was that its debt is too large. This does not make logical sense, especially when others like Eswatini and Mauritania were told that their debt is too little. In addition, it is also curious that the vote also attracted countries, such as Western Arab allies, who normally play a much smaller role in Preparatory Commission proceedings, pushing the Canadian proposal that did not include Iran to reach the required two-thirds majority.
Clarity should be given on how the Canadian list of eight countries was produced, especially as multiple requests from certain member states for an explanation were met with no reply. The list does not contain a number of countries in addition to Iran that met the previously decided criteria, such as Ghana and Mozambique whose debt is less than the previous two years combined. As an illustration, Afghanistan and Gambia both paid their shares fully until 2014. Despite owing more than four times as much money to the organisation as Gambia, Afghanistan had its rights restored while Gambia did not. Both countries were willing to start a payment plan, so both should have met the criteria. Could it be that the difference lies in Afghanistan being a known Western ally, while Gambia is a fellow Francophone, West African country that would likely vote for the incumbent?
In addition, if both Comoros and Sao Tome and Principe applied on the basis that they are exempt under Article 19 of the UN Charter from paying expenses due to exceptional circumstances, why did only the former get allowance? Is it because the latter is also a West African country? Conversely, Sudan, which has not made financial contributions to the CTBTO in over a decade, managed to make it onto the list of eight countries. Could this be linked to President Trump’s recent commitment to rescind Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation in exchange for Sudan recognizing Israel?
It is no secret that the UN has a major diversity problem, as Westerners hold a disproportionate amount of positions ranging from junior to senior roles. In a year that has centred on racial justice, and specifically the disenfranchisement and death of Black lives, one ought to doubt the rationale of suppressing the vote of a number of African countries while also trying to unseat one of the handful of senior African leaders in the UN system. The incumbent at the CTBTO, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, is from Burkina Faso and has led the organisation for the last seven years after heading its International Data Centre (IDC). During this period of leadership, he has leaned on his technical background and diplomatic expertise to increase the Treaty’s relevance across the world, including in many parts of the Global South that were not previously fully engaged with the organisation. And of equal importance, he has been a beacon of hope for the thousands of young people he has mobilised — many in countries like India and Pakistan which still need sign and ratify the Treaty – to care about nuclear insecurity. (Disclaimer: I have worked directly with the current Executive Secretary for a number of years on such policy and outreach efforts and am speaking from first-hand knowledge).
A number of countries stated that the incumbent should be allowed to run in the election, making the case for why steady leadership would best protect the organisation given the current pandemic and geopolitical debate between the main three nuclear players, the United States, Russia, and China. To them, the incumbent has proven to accomplish a great deal at raising the profile of the Treaty under difficult circumstances. They feel he is best suited to maintain the highly technical functions of the organisation, seize opportunities for the Treaty’s further universalisation, and foster the partnerships needed to continue to build an intergenerational coalition to rally the eight remaining states needed for triggering the treaty’s entry-into-force. It is obvious to these countries that, as a results-oriented incumbent whose path to leadership started from within the organisation, he would be able to do this with the most agility and accuracy, especially with an incredible amount of looming uncertainty across the world.
Others, like the current, outgoing United States administration and some Western and Asia-Pacific states, have seen the forthcoming election as an opportunity to gain an even stronger foothold in Vienna, following the election of the US-backed candidate as the new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the passing of the late Japanese IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. The CTBTO and the IAEA are neighbours in Vienna, seen as the two key international bodies that constitute the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the Agency’s history, the Directors General have served for 4, 20, 16, 12, and 9 years. The late Director General Amano had stated that he would not exceed two terms but passed away in the first year of his third term, and the current Director General Rafael Grossi would not confirm during the subsequent 2019 elections that he would only stay for two terms.
When the CTBT was being negotiated, they saw the lack of term limits at the Agency and elsewhere to be a problem, which is why a two-term rule will kick in once the Treaty enters into force and there is a Director General. In the meantime, the resolution that established the Preparatory Commission specifies no term limits, even for first term.[3] Once it became apparent that many member states, including the European Union bloc, acknowledged that the incumbent at the CTBTO could legally participate in the election, it seems that a subsequent process that was meant to help more countries have a voice in that election was selectively used for political reasons.
With all this in mind, it seems ironic that efforts to replace the incumbent at the Preparatory Commission were originally backed by critiquing the possibility of him staying on for a third term. Such critique ignores the very different and daunting task of getting the Treaty over the finish line and the dangers of a potentially premature transition during a pandemic that could leave the organisation vulnerable to missing positive opportunities for progress. While many hope to see the election of a new US administration result in meaningful change for the CTBT, robust diplomatic experience with a much wider scope of countries will be needed to maintain and strengthen the Treaty’s resilience and relevance in the view of entry-into-force.
The nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control communities have all had difficult conversations this year on the need for diversity and inclusion amongst the “Third UN” — or the layer of think-tanks, NGOs, and other organisations that help with the knowledge production needed to solve deeply entrenched problems such as nuclear insecurity. However, we should not forget that these issues extend to the very international organisations tasked with modelling multilateralism in a time of polarisation and unpredictability. Recent reports of the US’s unilateral attempt to undermine the nomination of Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to the role of Director General of the World Trade Organisation in favour of a South Korean candidate and today’s news of American sidelining of Africans from the United Nations special envoy post for Libya raise important questions outside of the nuclear space as well.
While it is understandable that countries should, in principle, strive to meet their financial obligations to keep international organisations afloat, leading powers should not use current disarray to their benefit by selectively applying criteria. It arguably amounts to voter suppression, and on the United Nations 75th anniversary, all countries should be coming together to foster an atmosphere of inclusivity instead. In an effort to ensure a fair process, it is therefore important that the international community reflects upon the profound questions this recent experience has raised before electing the next Executive Secretary of the CTBTO.
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[1] The Executive Secretary is the custodian of the Preparatory Commission until the CTBT enters into force, at which point a Director-General will be appointed for a maximum of two, four-year terms. Until then, there are no legal term limits, even for the first term, established under the resolution that created the Preparatory Commission (CTBT/MSS/RES/1).
[2] Between 21 June and 15 November 2020, Argentina, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Grenada, Kiribati, Palau, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, and Tanzania offered enough financial contributions to be granted voting rights back.
[3] CTBT/MSS/RES/1
Disclaimer: The opinions articulated above represent my personal views and do not necessarily reflect the position of my employer, the European Leadership Network (ELN) or any of the ELN’s members.
